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pean and Pacific theaters of World War II.

This is also unconstitutional, because it exceeds the President's constitutional powers. Any possible authorization for a new war in North Vietnam by the President was withdrawn with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution by the Congress.

I have tried during the past 2 years to make these views known both by public statements and by my votes on the various resolutions designed to provide for withdrawal of our troops, and the return of our prisoners of war, and a termination of our participation in this war.

I shall this week participate in those activities in Congress which are designed to remove the United States from the war in Vietnam. This is the only way I know to stop further killing of Americans and Vietnamese and the horrible devastation of the whole Vietnam countryside. This will also achieve the release of our prisoners of war.

I have this day communicated these views by letter to the President of the United States.

Whether Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam will be under one form of government or another will be decided by the people indigenous to those areas as was true in the beginning, is now and ever shall be.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join in this special order because it is essential at this time to demonstrate that there are people within the American Government who have not lost all connection with the reality that exists in Southeast Asia today.

By ordering one of the most massive air armadas in human history to resume the bombing of North Vietnam, the administration has destroyed the last vestige of pretense that it is interested in getting out of our military involvement in Indochina. It has demonstrated beyond dispute that Vietnamization is a fraud; that neither in the White House nor in Saigon is there any serious intention of withdrawing our massive military presence from Indochina. If there were any who failed to perceive the growing gap between the rhetoric of Vietnamization and the reality of our involvement in the fighting, they must now see that the President has no more intention of withdrawing from Indochina than he has of withdrawing from Florida or California.

The tragic fact is that the President—ignoring the overwhelming lesson of the past 10 years—remains determined to impose a political settlement of his own devising in South Vietnam. Ten years, more than \$100 billion, the lives of more than 50,000 young Americans and millions of Asians have failed to impress this administration. Not until the American Government accepts the fact that the future political complexion of South Vietnam is beyond our capacity to determine will there be an end to the war in Indochina, and it is now clear beyond any dispute that not until the Congress of the United States asserts its constitutional right as a coequal branch will be Government take that position.

As Members of Congress, we are complicit in the devastation of Indochina as

long as we fail to exercise our unquestioned right to end our participation in the war. The reckless and senseless escalation of the bombing should bring home to all of us the need for legislating an end to the war immediately. Our obligation as the representative branch of Government cannot be met by anything else.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, the President's Vietnamization program has not only been a failure—it has been a fraud. While the President has attempted to reassure the American people with a scene of a war dwindling away, the truth is that the administration is engaged in a massive escalation of the war in Southeast Asia.

Behind the facade of such terms as "Vietnamization" and "protective reaction," the facts of Vietnam remain as brutal and ugly as ever.

No amount of Presidential rhetoric can mask the fact that the President's policy is not one of peace—but of continued death and destruction.

We have not prevented a bloodbath in Vietnam. We have created one.

This dreadful war has drained our resources and stained our conscience. It has sacrificed thousands of our most precious possessions—our young men—to the jaws of death. It has warped our priorities. It has brought the twin plagues of unemployment and inflation to our economy. It has brought alienation, division, and bitterness to our people.

The President's policy of military adventurism is in direct violation of the will of the people and the letter of the law.

Section 601 of the Military Procurement Act of 1971—Public Law 92-156—declares it to be the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest practicable date all U.S. military operations in Indochina and to provide for the withdrawal of all U.S. military forces at a date certain subject to the release of all American prisoners of war.

Not only has the President ignored this—the law of the land—but he has embarked upon a policy in direct opposition to it.

As we meet here today, American war planes are ravaging Southeast Asia, spreading the conflict to the North including Hanoi and Haiphong. An American armada is being assembled off the coast of North Vietnam. As the Washington Post editorialized in this morning's paper:

What President Johnson and his predecessors steadfastly tried not to do over 15 years or more, President Nixon has managed to do almost overnight: he has brought the war in Indochina to the brink of a head-on confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The people of this Nation have repeatedly demonstrated their steadfast opposition to such a policy: in the public opinion polls, in the voting booth, and in the streets. They want peace, and they want it now.

Yet the President—as deaf as his so-called majority is silent—continues to fuel the fires of conflict, involving us ever deeper in the devastation of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Such callous disregard for the will of

the people and the laws of the United States cannot be countenanced.

As I have pointed out time and time again since I stood on this very floor and cast my vote against the very first appropriation bill to support American military intervention in Indochina in May of 1965, it is the Congress which has the constitutional responsibility over war and peace. And the Congress must exercise that responsibility—now.

We are the elected representatives of the American people. This House cannot close its eyes to their desires any longer.

This House cannot close its eyes to the horrors of war any longer.

This House cannot shirk its responsibilities any longer.

The war must end. And we must end it.

We have an obligation to our country and to ourselves to do everything within our power to bring the bloodshed and devastation in Vietnam to an immediate halt. I call upon my colleagues to join with me in demanding that the President order an immediate halt to all American air strikes in Southeast Asia; that he immediately order a resumption of the Paris negotiations and instruct our delegates to offer a commitment for the total withdrawal of all American troops by a prompt date certain in return for the release of our prisoners of war. And I ask my colleagues to join with me in supporting any and all legislation to cut off funding for this immoral and brutal war.

As I stated on May 5, 1965:

We cannot bomb people into democracy, nor can we bomb people into negotiations.

It is high time that our policy in Southeast Asia reflect this fact.

The President's policy is only perpetuating the mistakes of the past, the horrors of the past. That policy must change. And it is the Congress that must change it.

On Saturday, April 15, I sent a telegram to the President on behalf of myself and the over 1,000 citizens participating in the Twelfth Annual West Side Community Conference which I sponsored. I include the text of that telegram at this point in the RECORD.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., April 15, 1972.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.:

Over 1,000 citizens assembled for the 12th Annual West Side Community Conference, sponsored by the Democratic and Liberal Clubs of Manhattan's West Side and Representative William F. Ryan, demand the immediate cessation of all American bombing in Southeast Asia, the immediate resumption of the Paris peace talks, the immediate end of all American military adventurism, and the immediate withdrawal of all American forces from Southeast Asia.

Representative WILLIAM F. RYAN.
(Member of Congress on behalf of participants of the 12th Annual West Side Community Conference and himself.)

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, the recent U.S. air strikes on Hanoi and Haiphong are strange phenomena, indeed. On the one hand, the Congress and the public have been informed by the Nixon administration that the so-called Vietnamization program has been highly

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STATINTL

Bombing Hotly Debated In the Johnson Period

By TERENCE SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 16

The merits of the air war over North Vietnam, and particularly the question whether to bomb targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, were fiercely debated within the Johnson Administration from the outset of the air strikes in the spring of 1965.

The Pentagon's history of the Vietnam war reveals that there was a constant tugging match at the highest levels in the Administration between those who doubted the value of the bombing and feared its political repercussions and those who regarded it as an invaluable weapon that should be employed to the fullest.

The Pentagon history, an account of which was published by The New York Times in a series of articles last year, disclosed that the intelligence community was generally skeptical about the efficacy of the bombing, while the military and others supported it and urged its expansion.

Ultimately, President Lyndon B. Johnson resolved the debate by suspending the entire bombing campaign, known as Operation Rolling Thunder, on Oct. 31, 1968.

The Central Question

The question whether to strike at Hanoi and Haiphong, the so-called "top of the funnel" through which North Vietnam's war matériel flowed, was always at the center of the debate.

As early as October, 1966, Robert S. McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, was urging that the United States end its bombing of North Vietnam or at least shift the targets from the capital and its port to the staging areas and infiltration routes to the south.

In a memorandum to the President on Oct. 14, he argued that shifting the targets "would narrow the bombing directly to the objectionable infiltration areas and would reduce the international heat on the U.S."

To support his argument, Mr. McNamara appended an appraisal of the bombing by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency that asserted: "As of July, 1966, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had had no measurable direct effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in the South."

The intelligence estimate concluded that this situation was "not likely to be altered by reducing the present geographic constraints, mining Haiphong and the principal harbors of North Vietnam or otherwise expanding the U.S. air offensive along the lines now contemplated in military recommendations and planning studies."

Joint Chiefs Disagree

In a memorandum to Mr. McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took direct objection to this assessment and to his recommendations. They argued that "to be effective, the air campaign should be conducted with only those minimum constraints necessary to avoid indiscriminate killing of population."

Specifically, the Joint Chiefs recommended an expansion of the campaign that "would decrease the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary areas, authorize attacks against the steel plant, the Hanoi railyards, the thermal power plants, selected areas within Haiphong port and other ports."

The Joint Chiefs maintained that the air campaign was "an integral and indispensable part of our over-all war effort."

Mr. McNamara was not persuaded. In a memorandum to the President a month later, on Nov. 17, 1966, he observed that "at the scale we are now operating, I believe our bombing is yielding very small marginal returns, not worth the cost in pilot lives and aircraft."

Another significant voice in the debate was that of George Bundy, the President's national security adviser, who was not opposed to the bombing, but objected to its expansion. He argued in a memorandum to the President in May, 1967, that the real value of the campaign had been its detrimental effect on North Vietnamese infiltration and beneficial effect on South Vietnamese morale and concluded that "Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues simply are not going to change their policy on the basis of losses from the air in North Vietnam."

Noting that "there is certainly a point at which such bombing does increase the risk of conflict with the Soviet Union and China," he added: "I think it is clear that the case against going after Haiphong

harbor is so strong that a majority would back the Government in rejecting that course."

Mr. Bundy's successor as national security adviser, Walt W. Rostow, picked up the debate in a subsequent memorandum entitled "United States strategy in Vietnam," which circulated throughout the top level of the Administration. Sensitive to the criticisms of the bombing, Mr. Rostow wrote of the North Vietnamese:

"We have never held the view that bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area alone would lead them to abandon their effort in the South. We have never held the view that bombing Hanoi-Haiphong would directly cut back infiltration. We have held the view that the degree of military and civilian cost felt in the North and the diversion of resources to deal with our bombing could contribute marginally—and perhaps significantly—to the timing of a decision to end the war."

Three Options Cited

As Mr. Rostow saw it, the United States had three options.

"Closing the top of the funnel" was the first. He wrote that "under this strategy, we would mine the major harbors and perhaps bomb port facilities and even consider a blockade."

"Attacking what is inside the funnel," was second. This option included continued bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area, which was under way at the time.

"Concentration on route packages 1 and 2"—the infiltration routes to the south.

Mr. Rostow rejected No. 1 as incurring too many risks with too little return and urged the adoption of No. 3, while holding open the option of raids on Hanoi and Haiphong "when they make sense." He added the comment, "I believe we are wasting a good many pilots in the Hanoi-Haiphong area without commensurate results."

Secretary McNamara's disenchantment with the bombing campaign continued to grow. In a draft memorandum written for Mr. Johnson in 1967, he observed, "There continues to be no sign that the bombing has reduced Hanoi's will to resist, or her ability to ship the

McNamara Notes the Cost

Mr. McNamara rejected the various suggestions for expanded air activity as involving unacceptable risk and urged, once again, a staged reduction of the bombing of North Vietnam above the 20th Parallel in an effort to persuade Hanoi to compromise. He argued,

"The air campaign against heavily defended areas costs us one pilot in every 40 sorties. In addition, an important but hard-to-measure cost is domestic and world opinion: there may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go."

"The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 non-combatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one."